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Abstract
This article offers an analysis of the objective and substance of Norway’s readmission 
agreements in light of European Union readmission policies. It explores how readmis-
sion policy developments on the EU level also impact Norway’s practice, and argues 
that EU practice influences Norway’s work on readmission in three important ways. 
First, as part of a preventative strategic policy, Norway seeks to conclude readmis-
sion agreements with countries with which EU readmission agreements (EURA) exist. 
Second, EU visa facilitation agreements that are paired with EURAs form an indirect 
link between EU and Norwegian readmission agreements. Third, Norway uses the 
EURA-format as a basis for negotiations even with countries where no EURA exists. 
This article also examines Norway’s participation in the EU Global Approach on 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM), and finds that it is limited by the GAMM being only 
tangentially within the Schengen cooperation, and also by national political percep-
tions about linking readmission and development aid.
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1 Introduction
Readmission agreements are one of the oldest instruments used by states 
to control migratory flows, and are increasingly used to combat irregu-
lar migration within both the European Union (EU) and Norway.1 The 
‘Stockholm Programme’, which establishes the EU’s priorities in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice for the period 2010–2014, specifically provides 
that ‘an effective and sustainable return policy is an essential element of a 
well-managed migration system within the Union’.2 EU readmission agree-
ments (EURAs) have been described as ‘essential tools’ in the ‘fight against 
immigration’.3 Concluding bilateral readmission agreements with third coun-
tries is also among Norway’s top priorities.4 While it is not a member of the 
European Union, Norway strives to harmonize its migration policies to match 
those of the EU and its member states.5 Today, it seeks close cooperation with 
the EU on almost all matters of immigration and asylum, and has prioritized 
close dialogue with the EU Commission with regard to the conclusion of read-
mission agreements.6 
This article seeks to explore in what manner, and to what extent, readmis-
sion policy developments on the EU level also impact Norway’s practice; in 
other words, what is the de facto influence of the EURAs on Norway’s readmis-
sion practice? By elaborating on Norway’s readmission agreements in light of 
1 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council: Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements, Doc. No. COM (2011) 76 final 
(23 February 2011) (Evaluation of Readmission Agreements), at 2; A. Roig and T. Huddleston, 
‘EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-Evaluation of the Political Impasse’, 9 European Journal 
of Migration and Law (2007) 363–387 at 366–367. See also N. Coleman (2009), European 
Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 
2 Council of the European Union (2010), ‘The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure 
Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens’, Official Journal of the European Union C115/8.
3 Council of the European Union (2011), Council Conclusions Defining the European Union 
Strategy on Readmission (Council Conclusions on Readmission). Doc. no. 11260/11 MIGR 118, 
at 2.
4 Ministry of Justice and Public Security ( JD). Proposition to the Storting: Prop 1 S (2012–2013) 
(Prop 1 S (2012–2013)), para. 4.2. 
5 JD (2009), Meld St. 9 (2009–2010) Norsk flyktning- og migrasjonspolitikk i et europeisk perspe-
ktiv (White Paper on Immigration), at 21; Ministry of Justice and the Police ( JD). Proposition 
to the Storting: Prop 1 S (2011-2012) (Prop 1 S (2011–2012)), at 22. See generally V. Vevstad (2006), 
Utvikling av et felles europeisk asylsystem: jus og politikk, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; J.P. Brekke 
(2011), ‘Migrasjon og Integrasjon: Norges tilknytning til EU’, Europautredningen, report no. 10.
6 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, at 77ff.
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the EURAs, this article aims to offer a first academic analysis of Norway’s read-
mission policy. The first introductory part of this article provides a brief over-
view of Norway’s relationship with the EU with regard to migration issues in 
general, and return and readmission in particular. The article continues with an 
elaboration of EU and Norwegian target countries, as well as an exploration of 
how readmission agreements concluded on an EU-level influence Norwegian 
readmission agreements. Part three of this article concerns the negotiation 
of readmission agreements, and, in view of EU developments, examines par-
ticularly how, and to what extent, readmission is integrated into Norwegian 
foreign policies. 
2 Return and Readmission: Norway’s Schengen and EU Relationships
While Norway, as a non-EU member, is only indirectly7 linked to the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS),8 the Schengen agreement establishes one 
of the strongest links between Norway and the EU structure. The Schengen 
cooperation ensures freedom of movement on European territory and a joint 
responsibility for guarding external borders. Norway participates at all consul-
tation levels in the Schengen ‘Mixed Committee’: working parties, Strategic 
Committee of Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA), and permanent 
representatives (COREPER).9 When Norway and other associated states 
(Iceland and Switzerland) participate in the Mixed Committee, they have full 
participation and speaking rights, but no voting rights. 
Through the Schengen cooperation, Norway is also formally bound by many 
of the EU’s return policies. The Directive on Return, setting out common rules 
and procedures to be applied in EU member states and related Schengen 
countries for returning irregular third-country nationals and adopted by the 
EU in late 2008, is one example. It was adopted by the Norwegian Parliament 
7 Norway’s participation in the Dublin-cooperation is one important exception. See V. Vevstad 
(2013), ‘Felles yttergrense og felles europeisk asylsystem’, in: Ø. Øyen (2013), Lærebok i utlend-
ingsrett. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, Norway.
8 In Tampere in 1999, EU leaders committed to establish a Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS), The first phase of the CEAS was completed in 2006 under the Hague Program setting 
out the framework for a Common European Asylum System. A second phase of the harmoni-
zation process was completed in 2013 by the final adoption of the recast of the EU directives 
and regulations on asylum. See further European Parliament (2013), Parliament gives green 
light to the new European asylum system (press release). 
9 F. Bøckman Finstad, ‘EUs justis- og innenrikspolitikk’, 25 Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift (2008) 336–347 
at 340.
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in December 2010.10 The return of irregular migrants is currently at the core 
of Norway’s priorities, and the Government has developed a Return Strategy 
for the period 2011–2016. This strategy aims at furthering comprehensive and 
result-oriented returns, speedy returns, and sustainable return solutions.11 
Following Norway’s intensification of its return work, the number of forced 
returns doubled between 2006 and 2011, topped 4902 in 2012, and reached an 
all-time high in 2013 with 5934 returns.12 
Norway appears highly motivated to maintain close contact and coordi-
nation with the EU’s return policy. One clear expression of this policy is the 
2009 White Paper on Norwegian Refugee and Migration Policy in a European 
Perspective, which also recognizes that policy developments in the EU will 
influence Norway.13 It stresses Norway’s participation in Frontex, the European 
bureau for border control in charge of coordination of operationalizing returns 
to countries of origin.14 Frontex operations are a part of the Schengen coopera-
tion, and approximately one half of the 26 chartered flights used by Norway 
to return irregular migrants in 2010 were Frontex Joint Return Operations.15 
To keep updated on general developments in European migration policy, 
Norwegian institutions have also joined the European Migration Network 
(EMN), an initiative aimed at intensifying European cooperation in matters of 
migration.16 In June 2013, Norway additionally finalized working arrangements 
10 See European Union Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in 
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (2008); Norwegian 
Parliament (2010–2011), Vedtak til lov om endringer i utledningsloven (gjennomføring av 
returdirektivet), Lovvedtak 33, doc. No. Innst. 137 L (2010–2011).
11 Ministry of Justice and the Police ( JD) (2011), Strategi for returområdet 2011–2016. See also 
JD. Prop 1 S (2012–2013), supra note 4, Table 2.31 ‘Utvikling i antall tvangsreturer 2006–2011’.
12 JD. Prop 1 S (2012–2013), Table 2.25; Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, Vårkonferensen 
2013: Retur (2013); National Police Immigration Service (PU) (2013), Månedsstatistikk 
desember 2013: Uttransporteringer fra Norge. 
13 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5. A summary in English is available 
online at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/JD/Vedlegg/Faktaark/Migrasjonsmld_eng 
.pdf. 
14 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, at 79.
15 See European Migration Network (EMN)/Norwegian Directorate of Police (PD) (2012), 
Practical Measures for Reducing Irregular Migration: the case of Norway, at 45; JD. Prop 1 S 
(2012–2013), supra note 4, Table 2.31 ‘Utvikling i antall tvangsreturer 2006–2011ʼ; Ministry of 
Justice and the Police ( JD). Proposition to the Storting: Prop 1 S (2010–2011) (Prop 1 S (2010–
2011)), at 103; JD. Prop 1 S (2011–2012), supra note 5, at 127; JD. White Paper on Immigration, 
supra note 5, para. 5.5.3; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (2010), Arbeidsprogram for EU/
EØS-saker 2010/2011.
16 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, at 78.
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for its participation in the European Asylum Office (EASO), which is an EU 
agency aiming to enhance practical cooperation on asylum matters and help 
EU Member States fulfill their European and international obligations to give 
protection to people in need. This arrangement will inter alia allow Norway to 
participate in EASO’s work and to be represented in the EASO Management 
Board as an observer.17
The conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements is one way that Norway 
has intensified its work on returns.18 It concludes amongst the highest number 
of readmission agreements in Europe, and the former center-left Government’s 
2009 Political Platform specifically stated that it shall:
. . . intensify [its] work to establish good return agreements, conduct a 
comprehensive and unified return policy and use [its] aid and develop-
ment policy to support work with returns and reintegration of persons 
without legal residence in Norway.19
This focus is also maintained in the 2013 Political Platform of the newly elected 
Government formed by the Conservative Party and the Progress Party.20
The conclusion of readmission agreements essentially aims to influence 
the migration flows both to and from Norway. Here, as well as in the EU, such 
agreements intend to reduce irregular presence (by increasing the number of 
returns), and discourage future irregular migration (by sending a clear signal to 
individuals without protection needs that they might be returned when their 
asylum applications are rejected).21 The agreements are technical instruments 
17 EASO (2013), Norway, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Iceland finalise working arrange-
ments for their participation in the work of EASO. Press release, Doc. No. 05/2013.
18 See, for instance, Ministry of Labour (AD) (2005), Styrker innsatsen for integrering av 
innvandrere. Press Release no. 6. 
19 Government of Norway (GoN) (2009), Political Platform as Basis for the Government’s 
Work, formed by the Labour Party, Socialists Left Party and Centre Party, 2009–2013 (Political 
Platform), at 80.
20 GoN. (2013), Political Platform for a government formed by the Conservative Party and the 
Progress Party, 7 October 2013.
21 Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion. Proposition to the Storting: St. prp. nr. 1 (2008–
2009), at 328, Table 6.8; AD. (2005), Styrker innsatsen, supra note 18; EMN/PD. (2012), 
Practical Measures, supra note 15, at 13; National Police Immigration Service (PU) (2012), 
Strategi 2012–2016, at 5; JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 
10.13; Commission of the European Communities (2002), Green Paper on a Community 
Return Policy on Illegal Residents, Doc. no. COM (2002) 175 final, at 23; Commission of 
the European Communities (2003), On the Development of a Common Policy on Illegal 
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aimed at improving the cooperation between administrations, and can only be 
used after a return decision has been made in accordance with the guarantees 
inter alia set out by the Directive on Return.
Although Article 23 of the Schengen Convention explicitly refers to readmis-
sion agreements and provides that aliens must be expelled from the territory of 
the contracting party in which they were apprehended, the European Council 
concluded in March 2000 that readmission agreements were not Schengen-
relevant.22 Rather, EU readmission agreements have been considered to fall 
under the EU’s external policies. The associated Schengen countries (Norway, 
Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein) are not parties to the EU’s foreign policy 
and do not as such officially participate in the negotiation of EU readmission 
agreements. As this article will suggest, however, the EU’s work on readmission 
has a considerable impact also on Norway’s readmission practice. 
After it was decided that EU readmission agreements23 would not form 
part of the Schengen acquis, the European Commission, authorized to enter 
into readmission agreements on behalf of EU member states,24 included in 
all its EURAs a joint declaration which encourages countries with which it 
signs agreements to enter into corresponding agreements with the associated 
Schengen countries, including Norway. The Norwegian government has also 
made clear that it wishes to rely on the readmission agreements concluded 
by the EU and to negotiate similar agreements with countries with which 
the EU already has concluded EURAs.25 Since the spring of 2010, Norway and 
the European Commission meet yearly for consultations on readmission 
Immigration, Smuggling and Trafficking of Human Beings, External Borders and the Return 
of Illegal Residents, Doc. no. COM (2003) 323 final, at 8; Council of the European Union. 
(2011) Council Conclusions on Readmission, supra note 3. See also Coleman, supra note 1 
at 57.
22 For a general discussion, see Coleman, supra note 1.
23 While the EU has had competence to conclude readmission agreements with other 
states since the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides an express legal base to do so. 
Article 79 (3) provides: ‘The Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the 
readmission to their countries of origin or provenance of third country nationals who do 
not or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the territory 
of one of the Member States.’
24 It is worth noting that the EURAs which it negotiates do not bind all EU member states. 
While the United Kingdom and Ireland have the possibility to opt in or opt out, Denmark, 
which abstained completely from some aspects of the Treaty of Amsterdam, has to con-
clude its own bilateral readmission agreements. 
25 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 5.5.3.
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agreements.26 This practice signalizes a recent policy change in Norway’s 
approach to the EU – from initially having the sole ambition to fulfill Norway’s 
commitments in the Dublin- and Schengen cooperations, to a more active 
policy from 2008 onwards aimed at implementing the EU immigration and 
asylum acquis as a whole.27
Several outside observers have nevertheless expressed concern about the 
top-down approach when it comes to Norway’s Schengen participation, and 
its increasing involvement in European asylum initiatives such as EMN and 
EASO. Eriksen has argued that the government’s and administration’s role is 
strengthened on behalf of the Norwegian Parliament.28 Sejersted and Vevstad 
have similarly pointed out that Norway’s relationship to the EU’s Justice and 
Home Affairs, which subsumes Schengen, is characterized by frequent change, 
legal complexity and, often, a lack of public debate.29 Amid a development in 
which it is increasingly unclear which processes are Schengen-relevant and 
which are not – EU readmission practice being a case in point – Norway is for-
mally excluded from some decision-making developments, yet often chooses 
to align itself with broader EU policies. As this article will show, the EU has 
begun to construct policy packages not confined to one policy area alone, and 
the Schengen cooperation becomes only one part of the package. This devel-
opment has proven to be particularly challenging for associated states such as 
Norway.30
3 Norway’s Readmission Agreements: Target Countries and Scope 
3.1 Introduction
This section introduces Norway’s readmission agreements and compares 
Norway’s target countries with those of the European Union. By exploring 
the agreements in light of the EURAs, it also examines Norway’s readmission 
agreements in terms of scope and content. 
26 JD (2010), Gjennomføringsplan for utlendingsfeltet, at 35; MFA (2010), Arbeidsprogram, 
supra note 15.
27 Brekke (2011), Migrasjon og integrasjon, supra note 5, at 7.
28 E.O. Eriksen, ‘Norges demokratiske underskudd’, 25 Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift (2008) 368–379 
at 373.
29 F. Sejersted, ‘Norges rettslige integrasjon i EU’, 25 Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift (2008) 313–322 at 
316; Vevstad (2006), supra note 5, at 18.
30 MFA (2005), St. meld. 23 (2005–2006) Om gjennomføring av europapolitikken, at 21; 
Bøckman Finstad (2008), supra note 9 at 337.
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3.2 Target Countries
Norway’s first readmission agreement in modern time was signed with the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. This was followed by a readmission clause 
embedded in the 1990 visa facilitation agreement with the Czech Republic. 
Norway’s initial agreements and negotiations were largely ad hoc in nature, 
and it was only with the agreement with Romania, signed in 2002, that a com-
prehensive and result-oriented readmission policy began to  materialize.31 In 
2005 alone, Norway entered into six readmission agreements, bringing the 
total number of readmission agreements, or other agreements containing a 
readmission clause, to 16 countries.32 This number has increased to 30 in 2013, 
the most recent of which are with Tanzania, Georgia and Ethiopia.33 For an 
overview of the countries with which Norway has concluded readmission 
agreements, see Table 1. 
Although the European Union has mostly targeted transit countries situ-
ated close to the EU’s external borders, its first EURA was concluded with Hong 
Kong in 2002. A total of seven EURAs were signed in 2007, and, by early 2014, 
the EU had concluded agreements with 16 countries. With the exception of 
Macao, Pakistan, Cape Verde and Turkey, as Table 1 shows, all of these coun-
tries have concluded readmission agreements also with Norway. While many 
of these agreements are similar in scope and content to the standard EURA, 
as Section 2.4 will explain, some of Norway’s agreements with these countries 
were signed or negotiated before the existence of a EURA.
Norway’s and the EU’s common interests are evidenced in the partial over-
lap of target countries.34 Norway’s focus has in recent years lain steadily on 
approximately 20 states, including Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Liberia, Macao, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.35 Of these, EURAs already exist 
with Pakistan, Macao, and Turkey, while the European Commission is currently 
31 Interview JD (12 September 2013). All interviews referred to in this article were confidential. 
32 Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion (AD). (2006), Norges landrapport til 
Migrasjonsutvalget (Norges landrapport), at 3. 
33 In 2010, Norway also signed a readmission agreement with Kazakhstan, but the agree-
ment is not yet in force. See JD, Prop 1 S (2010–2011), supra note 15, at 186; JD. Prop 1 S 
(2011–2012), supra note 5, at 214; JD. Prop 1 S (2012–2013), supra note 4, at 117; Table 2.2 
‘Tilbaketakelsesavtalerʼ.
34 MFA (March 2013), Arbeidsprogram EU/EØS-saker 2013 (Arbeidsprogram), at 58.
35 See e.g., MFA (2013) Arbeidsprogram, supra note 34, at 58; JD. Prop 1 S (2010–2011), supra 
note 15, at 186; JD. Prop 1 S (2011–2012), supra note 5, at 214; JD. Prop 1 S (2012–2013), supra 
note 4, at 117; 199.
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TABLE 1 Countries with which Norway has concluded readmission agreements
Country Date of signature 
(Norway)
In force (Norway) Date of signature  
(EU)
In force (EU)
Federal Republic of 
Germany
18 March 1955 18 March 1955 N/A N/A
Czech Republic 12 July 1990 12 July 1990 N/A N/A
Estonia 14 January 1997 11 May 1997 N/A N/A
Latvia 15 May 1997 1 July 1997 N/A N/A
Lithuania 15 December 1992 15 December 1992 N/A N/A
Bulgaria 16 December 1998 26 September 1999 N/A N/A
Sri Lanka 6 March 2000 6 March 2000 4 June 2004 1 May 2005
Romania 17 July 2002 24 July 2003 N/A N/A
Sweden 18 December 2003 18 December 2003 N/A N/A
Croatia 24 January 2005 30 July 2005 N/A N/A
Slovakia 15 February 2005 28 May 2005 N/A N/A
Moldova 31 March 2005 9 August 2006 10 October 2007 1 January 2008
Switzerland 16 June 2005 22 September 2005 N/A N/A
Bosnia-Herzegovina 30 June 2005 25 November 2007 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Afghanistan 10 August 2005 10 August 2005 N/A N/A
Hong Kong 15 September 2006 1 January 2007 27 November 2002 1 March 2004
FYR Macedonia 25 September 2006 21 June 2007 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Russia 8 June 2007 1 December 2008 25 May 2006 1 June 2007
Vietnam 29 June 2007 4 July 2007 N/A N/A
Ukraine 13 February 2008 1 September 2009 18 June 2007 1 January 2008
Albania 12 September 2008 1 May 2009 14 Apr. 2005 1 May 2006
Burundi 10 March 2009 10 March 2009 N/A N/A
Iraq 15 May 2009 15 May 2009 N/A N/A
Montenegro 16 December 2009 16 December 2009 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Armenia 20 January 2010 26 June 2010 19 Apr. 2013 Not in force
Kazakhstan 12 October 2010 Not in force N/A N/A
Tanzania 5 April 2011 5 April 2011 N/A N/A
Georgia 10 November 2011 25 January 2012 22 November 2010 1 March 2011
Ethiopia 26 January 2012 26 January 2012 N/A N/A
Macao N/A N/A 10 October 2007 1 January 2008
Pakistan N/A N/A 26 October 2009 1 December 2010
Cape Verde N/A N/A 18 Apr. 2013 Not in force
Turkey N/A N/A 16 December 2013 Not in force
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negotiating with Azerbaijan and Morocco, and attempting to formally com-
mence negotiations with China and Algeria.36 As for Turkey, Norway’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has previously stated that as soon as the Turkish EURA 
is concluded, it will ‘immediately’ follow up and initiate negotiations for a cor-
responding agreement.37 Such statements have previously been put forward 
also with regard to Pakistan, but no Norwegian agreement with Pakistan exists 
to date. 
However, Norway seeks to conclude readmission agreements with all states 
with which it has a ‘migration relation’, and as the above listing also shows, it 
aims to also conclude agreements with countries where no EURA or negotiating 
directive exists.38 Countries are selected on the basis of the number of returns 
from Norway; which countries it is facing challenges with when it comes to 
readmitting individuals; and an evaluation of which countries it expects 
that a readmission agreement would facilitate return to.39 Norway’s focus on 
concluding readmission agreements with countries in the Horn of Africa is 
an example of this; an agreement with Ethiopia was recently concluded and 
Somalia/Somaliland, Djibouti and Eritrea are amongst its top priorities. None 
of these countries have been explicitly prioritized on the EU-level, although, as 
we shall see in Section 3.4, the EU included Ethiopia in its Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM).40 
In 2012, the EU’s Joint Readmission Committee began identifying new target 
countries. Norway participated in this Committee and proposed countries with 
which it is facing challenges in readmission negotiations.41 The country recom-
mendations varied considerably among the Committee members, and there 
was substantial scepticism also in the Strategic Committee on Immigration, 
Frontiers and Asylum about granting the Commission new negotiating 
36 See JD (July 2012), EUs Innenriksområde: Oppsummering fra første halvår 2012 
(Oppsummering), at 26; European Commission. Evaluation of Readmission Agreements, 
supra note 1 at 6. See also C. Billet, ‘EC Readmission Agreements: A Prime Instrument of 
the External Dimension of the EU’s Fight against Irregular Immigration: An Assessment 
after Ten Years of Practice’, 12 European Journal of Migration and Law (2010) 45–79 at 56.
37 See MFA (June 2011), Arbeidsprogram EU/EØS-saker 2011/2012 (Arbeidsprogram), at 48; 
MFA. (2013) Arbeidsprogram, supra note 34, at 58; JD (2009), Justis- og Innenriksfeltet: 
Halvårsrapport fra EU-delegasjonen høsten 2009.
38 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 5.5.3; JD. Prop 1 S (2012–2013), 
supra note 4, para. 4.2.
39 JD (2010), Gjennomføringsplan, supra note 26, at 35. 
40 PU (2009), Årsmelding 2009, at 10.
41 JD (2012), Oppsummering, supra note 36 at 26.
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mandates.42 Among the issues was a fear that EU negotiations with certain 
third states with which specific EU member states already had functioning 
bilateral readmission agreements (case in point: Afghanistan) would have the 
potential of creating more problems than they would solve. At present there is 
somewhat of an impasse within the EU as to the form of future EURAs, and the 
European Commission has suggested that readmission agreements should no 
longer be devised in a stand-alone fashion, but rather be a part of a coherent 
package. Such a package would include other incentives such as various visa 
related policy tools, financial assistance, and elements of the Global Approach 
to Migration ‘toolbox’.43 These issues and their implications for Norway are dis-
cussed further in Section 3. 
That said, the already existing EURAs have a tangible impact on Norway’s 
readmission policies, and it is to this topic that we now turn.
3.3 The Joint Declaration Concerning (Iceland and) Norway
As previously mentioned, the European Commission has been mandated to 
enter into readmission agreements with third countries on behalf of EU mem-
ber states. Norway is not a part of this arrangement, but the Commission asks 
third countries with which it enters into agreements to also enter into similar 
readmission agreements with Norway.44 All EURAs therefore contain a stan-
dard joint declaration stating that it would be ‘appropriate’ for Iceland and/or 
Norway to conclude a bilateral readmission agreement with the third country 
concerned. The Joint Declaration Concerning Iceland and Norway specifically 
provides that: 
The Contracting Parties take note of the close relationship between the 
European Community and Iceland and Norway, particularly by virtue 
of the Agreement of 18 May 1999 concerning the association of these 
countries with the implementation, application and development of 
the Schengen acquis. In such circumstances it is appropriate that [. . .] 
conclude a readmission agreement with Iceland and Norway in the same 
terms as this Agreement.
Some have questioned the practical impact of this declaration, claiming that 
it has not led to any tangible results when it comes to Norway’s negotiations 
42 JD (2012), EUs Justis og Innenriksområde: Oppsumering fra andre halvår 2012, at 25.
43 European Commission. Evaluation of Readmission Agreements, supra note 1 at 7.
44 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 10.11.
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with third states with which EURAs exist.45 Rather, scholars such as Brekke 
assert that Norwegian state officials have worked independently to negoti-
ate and conclude agreements with third states. Even though this declaration 
admittedly is more a political gesture than it is legally binding, contrary to 
the above assertions, this article argues that its effect is clearly noticeable in 
the Norwegian context. Even before the standard EURA was fully elaborated, 
Norway also expressed an expectation that the inclusion of such a declaration 
in future EURAs would facilitate Norway’s negotiations with the third coun-
tries concerned.46 
The EURAs appear to have influenced Norwegian readmission practice in 
three important ways. First, and as Section 3.2 will show, many of the EURAs 
are linked to visa facilitation agreements. In contrast to the EURAs, these visa 
facilitation agreements are considered Schengen-relevant. This essentially 
means that Norway, to ensure harmony in the Schengen-system, is under an 
obligation to enter into similar visa facilitation agreements. In concluding 
such agreements, it is clearly in Norway’s interest to also conclude interlinked 
readmission agreements. Thus, through the EU’s visa facilitation agreements, 
Norway is closely, albeit indirectly, associated to the EURAs. Second, Norwegian 
fear persists of receiving considerable asylum flows from countries where a 
EURA, but no Norwegian readmission agreement, is in place. Authorities, 
dreading augmented pressure on the Norwegian asylum system, actively seek 
to use the EURA declaration.47 Even though most of the countries with which 
there exists a EURA were not initially strategically important to Norway, it 
aims to conclude readmission agreements with these countries as a preventa-
tive strategic policy in order to pre-empt future problems.48 In the words of 
one informant, these agreements are simply ‘bonus agreements’ in addition 
to the more ‘important’ agreements which are grounded in more immediate 
Norwegian concerns.49 This relates to the third reason for Norway to enter into 
corresponding agreements: while Norway’s conclusion of many of these agree-
ments can not necessarily be seen as a response to any particular Norwegian 
45 Brekke (2011), supra note 5 at 16.
46 AD (2006), Norges landrapport, supra note 32 at 3. 
47 Interview JD (12 September 2013), See also JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra 
note 5, para. 5.5.3; JD. Prop 1 S (2012–2013), supra note 4, Table 2.2 ‘Tilbaketakelsesavtalerʼ; 
JD. Prop 1 S (2011–2012), supra note 5, at 214; AD (2009), Proposition to the Storting: St. prp. 
nr. 1 (2009–2010) (St. prp. Nr. 1 (2009–2010)), at 319; JD. Prop 1 S (2010–2011), supra note 15, 
at 187; Department of Municipal and Regional Development, St. prp. nr. 1 (2005–2006), 
at 89.
48 Interviews JD (13 and 18 September 2013). 
49 Interview JD (13 September 2013).
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concerns, they are important from a long-term perspective. Its agreements 
with, for example, Macao and Hong Kong may appear irrelevant in today’s 
context, but Macao may prove to be essential in Norway’s attempts to negoti-
ate readmission with states such as China. Through these agreements, Norway 
hopes to penetrate strategically important regions, and expects that negotia-
tions with one country will be facilitated if that country’s neighbor already has 
entered into a readmission agreement with Norway.50
Today, Norway follows EU developments closely in order to evaluate which 
types of agreements would be beneficial also for Norway. In cases where 
Norway and the EU have parallel negotiations with third states, information 
and experience are often exchanged between them.51 Norway and the EU have 
had parallel negotiations with Georgia, and, more recently, with Azerbaijan. 
While Norway began its negotiations with Georgia long before the EU, due to a 
prolonged Norwegian–Georgian stalemate concerning the format of one spe-
cific wording, the EU caught up and Norway ended up concluding its agree-
ment one year after the conclusion of the EURA.52 As for Azerbaijan, Norway 
faced considerable difficulties initiating negotiations, but these were eased 
once the EU began its negotiations, and both agreements are expected to be 
concluded shortly. Equally, once the EURA with Russia was in place, Norway’s 
lengthy negotiations with Russia were facilitated and a corresponding agree-
ment was concluded within a year.53 Norway’s agreement with Ukraine was 
also concluded within a year of the EURA, its agreements with Serbia and 
Montenegro within two, Albania within three, and Hong Kong within four. As 
we will see below, all of these agreements with the exception of Georgia are 
strikingly similar to their corresponding EURAs.
3.4 Norwegian Readmission Agreements: Clear EURA Influence 
While it is clear that Norway has concluded readmission agreements with 12 of 
the 15 countries with which the EU has a EURA, its agreements with Sri Lanka, 
Moldova, Armenia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were concluded 
50 Interview JD (18 September 2013).
51 MFA (2008), Betydningen av EUs migrasjonspolitikk for Norge (Fred-Olav Sørensen, «spe-
sialråd migrasjon», the Norwegian Mission to the EU, 29 November 2007); JD. Prop 1 S 
(2012–2013), supra note 4, Table 2.2 ‘Tilbaketakelsesavtalerʼ; JD. Prop 1 S (2011–2012), supra 
note 5, at 214; JD. Prop 1 S (2010–2011), supra note 15, at 187.
52 Interview JD (18 September 2013).
53 Department of Municipal and Regional Development and Norwegian Directorate of 
Immigration (UDI) (November 2002), Nyhetsbrev om norsk flyktning- og innvandring-
spolitikk, 9(41); AD. (2006), Norges landrapport, supra note 32 at 3.
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before EURAs existed with these countries. With the exception of Georgia, 
where Norwegian negotiations began before the Commission’s negotiations, 
all of Norway’s agreements that were concluded with third states after the con-
clusion of a EURA (i.e. Ukraine, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Hong 
Kong) essentially follow the structure and content laid out in the correspond-
ing EURA.
The European Commission strives to conclude uniform readmission agree-
ments, and the fact that most of the EURAs are identically structured indicates 
that it to a large extent succeeds in this aim.54 Most EURAs commence with a 
preamble and define certain notions, before being structured in eight sections. 
With the exception of Norway’s agreement with Ukraine, whose corresponding 
EURA comprises seven sections, all Norwegian agreements are in this respect 
made up of eight sections. Section I sets out the readmission obligations of 
the third contracting party and Section II does so in an identical manner for 
the European Union/Government of Norway.55 Section III describes the opera-
tional readmission procedure and sets time limits, application procedure and 
means of evidence, etc. Section IV deals with transit operations, Section V with 
the allocation of costs, and Section VI holds a non-affection clause along with 
a specific provision for data protection. Section VII of the Norwegian agree-
ments with Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Hong Kong differs – for obvious 
reasons – from Section VII of the corresponding EURAs in that the Norwegian 
agreement has two articles on ‘Joint Expert Group’ (or ‘Expert Meetings’ as in 
the case of Montenegro) and ‘Implementing Provisions’, while the EURA has 
three articles: ‘Joint Readmission Committee’, ‘Implementing Protocols’ and 
‘Relation to Bilateral Readmission Agreements or Arrangements of Member 
States’. An article on ‘Territorial Application’ which is inserted in the EURA’s 
final provisions of Section VIII is also missing in the corresponding Norwegian 
agreements with Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Russia. Neither the EURA 
nor the Norwegian agreement with Hong Kong appears to include a provision 
on ‘Territorial Application’. In the case of Ukraine, which has one section less 
than most other readmission agreements, the EURA includes an article on 
‘Relation to Bilateral Readmission Agreements or Arrangements of Member 
54 For an overview of the most difficult issues to agree upon in EURA negotiations, see 
F. Trauner and I. Kruse, ‘EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: A New 
Standard EU Foreign Policy Tool?’, 10 European Journal of Migration and Law (2008) 411–
438 at 429.
55 Note, however, that the EURAs with Ukraine and Pakistan hold seven sections; Sections I 
and II are addressed jointly in the first section. For an analysis of the standard draft EURA 
and all its provisions, see generally Coleman, supra note 1 at 87–109.
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States’ in Section VI, and an article on ‘Territorial Application’ in Section VII, 
neither of which is found in the corresponding Norwegian agreement. Finally, 
there are annexes which contain common lists of documents that prove 
nationality or the fulfilment of the conditions for readmission, as well as a 
model document to launch the readmission application. In most cases, these 
annexes are not included in Norway’s agreements, and neither are references 
to third-country nationals. 
The European Union’s influence on Norway’s readmission practice is perhaps 
most interestingly noted with respect to Norway’s agreements with Tanzania 
and Kosovo, as well as its not-yet-in-force agreement with Kazakhstan. While 
no corresponding EURA exists for these three cases (and Norway was thus not 
explicitly encouraged to follow a certain form), it has chosen to follow the 
standard EURA structure in these agreements. Its agreement with Tanzania 
essentially follows its agreement with Ukraine (in turn based on the cor-
responding EURA), while the agreement with Kosovo follows the standard 
eight-section EURA. In all of these cases, it was Norwegian state officials who 
proposed the usage of the standard EURA.56 From their perspective, there are 
good reasons to follow the EURA structure; the EURA is seen as a ‘safe’ and ‘reli-
able’ agreement that has been meticulously drafted on the EU-level and is thus 
unlikely to contain any unexpected or unpleasant loopholes.57 Because the 
EURA is extensive in scope, Norwegian state officials also find the agreement 
attractive to bring to the negotiating table simply because it, as opposed to 
other less substantial readmission agreements, can be reduced during negotia-
tions. It is well-known that it is decisively more difficult during negotiations to 
add, rather than to remove, clauses. In this sense, the EURA is unquestionably 
used by Norway as part of its negotiating strategy. 
3.5 Non-EURA-Related Agreements
Norway has also concluded readmission agreements with a number of coun-
tries that have not entered into corresponding agreements with the EU. While 
these agreements essentially fall outside the scope of this article, a few words 
must nevertheless be said. Croatia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, and Switzerland are all part of, 
or will soon be part of, the Schengen cooperation.58 Nationals of Schengen 
56 Interview JD (18 September 2013).
57 Interview JD (18 September 2013); MFA (2 October 2013).
58 Croatia, joining the EU in 2013, is expected to have joined the Schengen Area by 2015, while 
Romania and Bulgaria’s bids to join the Schengen area were approved by the European 
Parliament in 2011 but rejected by the Council of Ministers that same year. 
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countries are guaranteed free movement within the Schengen area. Moreover, 
the forced return of third-country nationals to EU- or Schengen-associated 
countries with which Norway has a readmission agreement is conducted with 
the use of directives such as the Return Directive. This means that any underly-
ing bilateral agreements are not used in these cases. 
More interesting are perhaps Norway’s agreements with Afghanistan, Sri 
Lanka, Burundi, Ethiopia, Iraq, Tanzania and Vietnam. Together with Norway’s 
agreement with Kosovo, its agreements with Iraq and Afghanistan have been 
considered to be the most successful of Norway’s agreements – the agreement 
with Afghanistan, which is a tripartite agreement with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has for example resulted in the return 
of approximately five individuals per week.59 The Sri Lankan agreement, on 
the other hand, made up of a brief correspondence laying out a total of five 
articles, was only in force for a two-year period and targeted primarily a very 
narrow group of individuals whom Norway wanted to return to Sri Lanka.60 
In contrast to Norway’s EURA-related agreements, which as mentioned 
earlier are comprehensive and relatively straightforward, several of Norway’s 
other readmission agreements are purposely ambiguous. Although Norway’s 
agreement with Iraq, for example, is not confidential, it has been deliberately 
withheld from all websites providing public access to Norwegian bilateral 
agreements and other legislation.61 Upon Iraqi request, the agreement has 
also been drafted in a manner that aims at downplaying, and ends up effec-
tively concealing, the fact that it concerns the forced return of Iraqi nationals. 
This attempt to intentionally draft an ambiguous agreement is also evident in 
Norway’s Ethiopian agreement, the draft proposal for which Ethiopia brought 
to the negotiating table. From the perspective of third states, this approach is 
understandable; readmission agreements mainly bring about negative conse-
quences for concerned third states, and politicians who actively assist in the 
forced return of their country’s nationals (i.e. promote these types of readmis-
sion agreements) may risk losing significant parts of their electorate. As one 
Norwegian state official points out, however, because these equivocal agree-
ments do not clarify what was agreed during the readmission negotiations, they 
are often difficult to implement in practice.62 For the purposes of predictabil-
ity and legal certainty, it would therefore appear preferable that Norway more 
persuasively advocated for the application of the standard EURA, as it has done 
59 Interview JD (18 September 2013).
60 Interview JD (12 September 2013).
61 Interviews JD (12 and 18 September 2013).
62 Interview JD (18 September 2013).
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in the cases of Tanzania, Kosovo and Kazakhstan. Doing so might also address 
some of the human rights concerns which have been raised with regard to a 
few of these agreements. The Ethiopian agreement has notably been criticized 
by Norwegian human rights organizations and the United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) alike for falling short on a 
number of core human rights standards.63
3.6 Conclusions
As this section has shown, there are several ways in which important aspects 
of Norway’s readmission strategy are developed in response to, and influenced 
by, the EU strategy on readmission. First, as part of a preventative strategic 
policy, Norway seeks to conclude readmission agreements with countries with 
which EURAs exist. With the exception of Georgia, all of Norway’s agreements 
that were concluded with third states after the conclusion of a EURA essen-
tially follow the structure and content laid out in the corresponding EURA. 
Second, through the many EU visa facilitation agreements that are paired with 
the EURAs, and in order to ensure harmony in the Schengen system, Norway 
is obligated to enter into visa facilitation agreements with these same states. 
Because it is usual in these situations to also negotiate readmission, the visa 
facilitation agreements form an indirect link between EU and Norwegian read-
mission agreements. Third, Norway attempts to use the EURA format as a basis 
for negotiations also with countries with which no EURAs exist. It has suc-
ceeded in doing so in its agreements with Tanzania, Kosovo and Kazakhstan. 
Finally, despite the fact that EURAs are considered non-Schengen-relevant, 
and Norway is formally excluded from important decision-making processes, 
by participating in forums such as the EU Joint Readmission Committee, 
Norway also has a limited opportunity to influence EU readmission policy.
4 Integrating Readmission into External Relations
4.1 Introduction
This section explores how readmission agreements relate to EU and Norwegian 
external relations. It begins by discussing the relation between visa facilitation 
63 UN OHCHR (2012), Communication from Special Procedures: Allegation Letter; JD (2012), 
Re: Memorandum of Understanding between Norway and Ethiopia.; NOAS (2012), 13 
Months of Sunshine?, Rapport fra NOAS’ faktasøkende reise til Etiopia; NOAS, and Save the 
Children Norway (2012), Returavtalen med Etiopia – barn som mister foreldre. All on file 
with author.
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and readmission, and continues with an examination of how Norway’s read-
mission agreements relate to its external relations and development aid poli-
cies. Finally, it examines Norway’s participation in the EU Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM).
4.2 Linking Readmission to Visa Facilitation 
Norway’s early readmission agreements were explicitly linked to the lifting of 
visa requirements. As many other European states during the 1990s, Norway 
was concerned that the lifting of visa requirements might lead to an increase 
in unauthorized entry.64 Readmission agreements were therefore concluded in 
parallel as a compensating safeguard, or, as in the cases of the Czech Republic 
and Lithuania, readmission was incorporated into a clause in the visa facilita-
tion agreement itself. Early on, the conclusion of readmission agreements with 
all countries in the Western Balkans, including Kosovo, proved to be a prereq-
uisite for opening up for visa facilitation for these same countries.65 
When negotiations on EU readmission agreements first commenced in 2001, 
however, the initial approach was to negotiate readmission agreements with 
third countries without offering anything in return. In order to convince third 
states to enter into readmission arrangements with the EU, it was nonethe-
less soon forced to develop a set of incentives.66 The link between visa facilita-
tion and readmission was made for the first time with the Russian Federation 
and the Ukraine, where negotiations really only materialized once the EU had 
committed to negotiate visa facilitation agreements in parallel. Since then, 
visa facilitation has been a requisite for many third states in return for their 
cooperation when it comes to readmission agreements, and visa negotiations 
have been frequently combined from the very beginning of the readmission 
negotiations.67 By 2013, the EU had signed visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements with 11 countries: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cape Verde, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Georgia, the 
Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine.68 
64 Coleman, supra note 1 at 16ff.
65 MFA (2010), Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), Norsk innsats for stabilitet og utvikling i Sørøst-
Europa (White Paper on Norway’s Efforts for Stability and Development in Southeastern 
Europe), para. 4.6. 
66 Trauner and Kruse (2008), supra note 54, at 415.
67 Ibid. at 416.
68 The exact content of these agreements vary, but many include visa facilitation or reduced 
visa costs for certain categories of citizens (typically diplomats), or simply facilitated visa 
procedures. See JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 5.5.3.
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Today, Norway has once again strengthened the linkage between visa facili-
tation and readmission agreements.69 To ensure harmony in the Schengen-
cooperation’s visa policies, where the EU has entered into visa facilitation 
agreements with third states, Norway has essentially been under an obligation 
to negotiate similar bilateral agreements with these same states.70 Out of the 
11 countries for which there exists both a EURA and a corresponding Norwegian 
agreement, as Table 2 shows, Norway has signed paired visa facilitation 
agreements with nine: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine. Georgia is 
seemingly the only state with which Norway and the EU both have readmis-
sion agreements but where the EU also has a visa facilitation agreement and 
Norway does not.
4.3 Readmission and External Relations
As previously indicated, readmission agreements and forced return mainly 
bring about negative consequences for concerned third countries.71 Unless 
they receive something worth more in return, these states seldom find it worth 
cooperating in readmission. To counter the difficulties faced by both Norway 
and the EU when negotiating readmission agreements, readmission has been 
increasingly incorporated into external relations and linked to development 
aid. Such agreements are also incorporated in broader bilateral cooperative 
frameworks which often include other strategic policy areas such as security, 
energy and trade.72 As we will see, however, the linking of readmission to exter-
nal relations within both Norway and the EU is not unproblematic.73
Even though the Norwegian administration of immigration has frequently 
been transferred from one ministry to the other and is divided between sev-
eral departments and directorates,74 the government has ever since the 1990s 
attempted to create greater cooperation between national authorities work-
ing with immigration issues and the MFA working with foreign aid and devel-
opment. Norway’s readmission agreements are today drafted in cooperation 
69 JD (2010), Gjennomføringsplan, supra note 26, at 35.
70 MFA (2011), Arbeidsprogram, supra note 37 at 48.
71 Trauner and Kruse (2008), supra note 54, at 431–434; MFA (2007), Betydningen av, supra 
note 51.
72 J.P. Cassarino (2010), Readmission Policy in the European Union, Strasbourg: European 
Parliament, at 25.
73 See, for instance, JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 6.2. See 
also Brekke (2011), supra note 5, at 16; J.P. Brekke (2001), Velkommen og farvel?: midlertidig 
beskyttelse for flyktninger i Norge, Oslo: Institute for Social Research. 
74 AD (2006), NOU 2006:14 Gransking av Utlendingsdirektoratet, at 61.
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TABLE 2 Visa facilitation agreements in Norway and the EU
Country Date of signature 
(Norway)
In force (Norway) Date of signature 
(EU)
In force (EU)
Czech Republic 12 July 1990 1 January 1993 N/A N/A
Estonia 7 Apr. 1997 1 May 1997 N/A N/A
Latvia 2 July 1997 1 August 1997 N/A N/A
Lithuania 15 December 1992 15 December 1992 N/A N/A
Russia 8 June 2007 1 December 2008 25 May 2006 1 June 2007
Ukraine 13 February 2008 1 September 2011 18 June 2007 1 January 2008
Albania 1 May 2008 1 May 2009 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Bosnia-Herzegovina 22 July 2008 1 May 2009 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
FYR Macedonia 28 July 2008 1 February 2009 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Montenegro 16 December 2009 16 December 2009 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Serbia 30 November 2009 Not in force 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Kazakhstan 12 October 2010 Not in force N/A N/A
Moldova 14 September 2011 1 December 2011 10 October 2007 1 January 2008
Armenia 9 November 2011 15 March 2012 17 December 2012 Not in force
Georgia N/A N/A 17 June 2010 1 March 2011
Cape Verde N/A N/A 16 October 2012 Not in force
between the MFA and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security ( JD). The 
MFA leads negotiations with certain countries – it is currently negotiating 
with Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, and was the lead agency for negotiations 
with Ethiopia – while the JD leads readmission negotiations with essen-
tially all other states.75 The MFA also leads the Coordination Committee for 
Readmission Agreements which includes representatives from the JD, the 
Ministry of Labour, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, and the 
National Police Immigration Service.76 Additionally, Norway practices a sys-
tem of Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs), in which Norwegian officials are 
posted to Norwegian embassies abroad in order to establish and maintain con-
tacts with the authorities of the host country with a view to contributing to the 
75 Personal communication, JD (30 September 2013).
76 For an example of earlier coordination groups, see Department of Municipal and Regional 
Development and UDI (2002), Nyhetsbrev (. . .), supra note 53. 
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prevention of illegal immigration.77 Some of these officers are explicitly tasked 
with strengthening Norway’s return work, inter alia to assist in concluding and 
implementing readmission agreements.78 In 2012, Norway had Immigration 
Liaison Officers focusing on return in Algeria, Thailand, Ethiopia and Jordan.79 
The system was evaluated in 2011, and the evaluation concluded that these offi-
cers indeed contributed to an increased number of returns and facilitated the 
negotiation of readmission agreements.80
For a long time, however, no reciprocities were linked to the readmission 
agreements.81 This approach changed with the issuance of the report Migration 
and Development – Better Context and Coordination in 2006. Here, an interde-
partmental working group recommended the closer integration of readmission 
agreements and development aid.82 This view was also mirrored in the center-
left government’s 2009 Political Platform, which clearly stated that it shall ‘use 
[its] aid and development policy to support work with returns and reintegra-
tion of persons without legal residence in Norway’, and explained that is has 
also earmarked resources to develop efforts which would make ‘poor countries’ 
more inclined to enter into readmission agreements with Norway.83 Together 
with the EU, Norway also participates in the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development (GFMD), where it is a member of the steering group and partici-
pates regularly in working groups and GFMD’s annual conference.84
When it comes to implementing this policy in practice, however, there 
appears to be a prevailing idea amongst state officials that the policy has not 
led to any tangible results.85 Several informants claim that there is not a single 
77 See, e.g., JD, Prop 1 S (2012–2013), supra note 4, at 3.5.3; Ministry of Labour and Social 
Inclusion, Proposition to the Storting: St. prp. nr. 1 (2008–2009), at 329.
78 See, e.g., JD, Prop 1 S (2011–2012), supra note 5, at 212; JD, Prop 1 S (2010–2011), supra note 
15, at 104; AD. (2009), St. prp. nr. 1 (2009–2010), supra note 47, at 318.
79 JD, Prop 1 S (2012–2013), supra note 4, Table 2.31 “Utvikling i antall tvangsreturer 2006–
2011”. See also Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, Proposition to the Storting: St. prp. 
nr. 1 (2008–2009), at 328–329; JD, Prop 1 S (2011–2012), supra note 5, at 212.
80 JD, Prop 1 S (2012-2013), supra note 4, at 3.5.3.
81 AD and MFA (May 2006), Migrasjon og utvikling – bedre sammenheng og samordning: 
Rapport fra en tverrdepartemental arbeidsgruppe, para. 4.9. 
82 Ibid. 
83 GoN (2009), Political Platform, supra note 19 at 80; JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, 
supra note 5, paras. 9.6; 10.11. See also AD (2009), St. prp. nr. 1 (2009–2010), supra note 47, 
at 21.
84 EMN (2011), Annual Policy Report 2011 Norway – Report to the European Migration Network 
from the Norwegian Contact Point, EMN Report 2(11), at 39.
85 Interviews JD (12, 13 and 18 September 2013); MFA (20 September 2013).
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example of where the policy to link readmission and development aid has 
resulted in anything concrete, and one informant insinuates that as of today, 
this link is merely political wishful thinking.86 State officials within the MFA 
equally describe the attempts at linking the two fields as deeply sensitive and 
strenuous.87 While the center-left Political Platform was unveiled in 2009, 
no real attempts at tackling the issue were made within the MFA until 2012, 
when in the aftermath of the controversial White Paper on Children Seeking 
Protection88 an internal working group was tasked with examining the issue 
more closely.89 Due to deep political divisions, however, this initiative is yet to 
deliver any meaningful development. 
This perceived gap between theory and practice has been ascribed by poli-
cymakers mainly to two factors. First, two very different mandates underpin, 
and create a certain tension between, the respective entities – the immigration 
authorities function with the aim of overcoming challenges in the national 
arena, while the focus of the MFA has largely been on the best interests of 
third states.90 According to certain state officials, the issue of forced return, 
and as such also readmission agreements, is seen as murky and to a great 
extent incompatible with the culture and spirit amongst many officials work-
ing with development aid.91 Linking readmission agreements to development 
aid is believed to undermine basic principles of development aid and poverty 
reduction.92 These officials describe a deeply rooted resistance to linking forced 
return with development aid, and a fear that development aid will become 
conditional upon the conclusion of readmission agreements. Making aid con-
ditional upon the conclusion of readmission agreements appears nevertheless 
to be a welcome development amongst several state officials within the JD, who 
also point to the Netherlands as an example of good practice in this regard.93 
A second, related, explanation is allegedly found in the Norwegian political 
landscape as it was prior to the general elections in the autumn of 2013, where 
one found a coalition government consisting of the Labour Party, Centre Party, 
and Socialists Left Party. The post of Minister of International Development 
86 Interviews JD (18 September 2013); MFA (20 September 2013).
87 Interview MFA (20 September 2013).
88 JD (2011), Meld. St. 27 (2011–2012) Barn på flukt (White Paper on Children Seeking 
Protection). 
89 Interview MFA (20 September 2013).
90 Brekke (2011), supra note 5, at 16. See also Brekke (2001), Velkommen og farvel, supra 
note 73.
91 Interview JD (12 September 2013).
92 Interview MFA (20 September 2013).
93 Interviews JD (12, 13 and 18 September 2013).
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was held by a representative of the Socialists Left Party, and because this Party 
has austerely resisted any linking of readmission agreements and development 
aid, there is a general perception that its dominance in the realm of Norwegian 
development aid functioned as an effective stumbling block against the imple-
mentation of this wider political goal.94 
Norway’s 2012 agreement with Ethiopia is a prominent example of the 
ambiguous relationship between readmission and development aid. After 
Norway had attempted to negotiate a readmission agreement with Ethiopia 
for approximately two decades, agreement was finally reached in February 
2012.95 A few months earlier, Norway had agreed to donate approximately 
350 million Norwegian kroner to forestry, energy- and agricultural projects 
in Ethiopia. This donation stirred certain media attention considering that it 
was in addition to the 200 million Norwegian kroner the Government already 
had committed to, and despite the fact that countries such as Sweden, in 
response to Ethiopia passing a number of ‘anti-human rights’ laws, chose to 
considerably reduce its development aid to Ethiopia. Norwegian authorities 
were subsequently fiercely accused of trading development aid for readmis-
sion, but representatives of both the JD and the MFA persistently denied any 
link between the two.96 There appears to be a widespread conviction amongst 
state officials in the JD that there was no intentional link on the part of Norway 
between the readmission agreement and the increase in development aid.97 
Norwegian state officials have rather argued that Norway, in contrast to the 
European Commission and ‘being a small country’, has little leverage when it 
comes to negotiating the conclusion of readmission agreements.98 Instead of 
threatening to withdraw development aid, or using such aid as an incentive for 
countries to conclude readmission agreements, Norway allegedly aims to capi-
talize on the negotiating party’s conscience and reputation. It may for example 
argue that if country x fails to negotiate readmission with Norway, nationals 
of country x engaged in criminal activity in Norway may risk tainting country 
x’s global reputation. Norway may also play to the conscience of country y and 
94 Interviews JD (18 September 2013); MFA (20 September 2013). 
95 Department of Municipal and Regional Development, St. prp. nr. 1 (2005–2006), at 90.
96 H. Hegtun et al. (17 March 2012), Doblet støtten til Etiopia før avtalen ble signert. 
Aftenposten; NTB (17 March 2012), Norge doblet Etiopia-støtte rett før returavtale. 
Dagsavisen; Mariam, A.G. (26 March 2012), No Way for Ethiopian Refugees in Norway, 
blog post available online at http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/2012/03/25/no_way_ 
for_ethiopian_refugees_in_norway. 
97 Interviews JD (12, 13 and 18 September 2013). 
98 Interview JD (18 September 2013).
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reason that because Norway financially or otherwise supports it, it would ‘be of 
tremendous help to Norway if country y gives back just a little bit’.99 These 
views are particularly interesting against the message conveyed in the newly 
elected Government’s Political Platform that the Government shall ‘. . . use 
Norway’s position to secure a greater number of such agreements.’100
That said, it remains unclear to what extent, if at all, Norway’s development 
aid may have de facto affected Ethiopia’s decision to enter into the readmission 
agreement. The eventual impact of Norway’s participation in the EU’s coopera-
tion platform with Ethiopia (see Section 3.4) is also unclear, but Norwegian 
state officials unanimously claim that there was no connection between the 
conclusion of the readmission agreement and Norway’s participation in the 
platform.101 This next section may offer clarity as to why they would argue this.
4.4 Norway and the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
Norway also participates – albeit thus far to a limited extent – in various 
aspects of the EU’s external migration policy. While there was initial scepti-
cism about linking return and readmission to external relations also within 
the EU, it has ever since the mid-2000s systematically integrated its migration 
policy’s external dimension in both external relations and development aid.102 
In 2011, the European Council even called for the EU readmission policy to be 
more embedded in the overall external relations policy of the EU.103 An impor-
tant trend is currently to negotiate with individual countries of origin on the 
basis of an entire package of measures, including readmission  agreements.104 
This policy finds expression in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM), which has been described as ‘a comprehensive approach [com-
bining] measures aimed at facilitating legal migration opportunities with 
those reducing illegal migration’.105 The Global Approach may be seen as the 
99 Interview JD (18 September 2013).
100 Emphasis added. GoN. (2013), Political Platform for a government formed by the 
Conservative Party and the Progress Party, 7 October 2013.
101 Interviews JD (12, 13 and 18 September 2013); MFA (20 September 2013). 
102 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 8.2; Coleman, supra note 1 
at 111ff.
103 Council of the European Union (2011), Council Conclusions on Readmission, supra 
note 3, at 3.
104 European Commission, The Global Approach to Migration One Year On: Towards a 
Comprehensive European Migration Policy, COM (2006) 735 final, at 9.
105 European Council (2007), Council Conclusions on the Global Approach to Migration, 
2807th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs. Luxembourg, 12 and 13 June 2007, at 3. 
See also Cassarino (2010), supra note 72, at 36.
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 overarching framework for the EU external migration policy, complementary 
to the EU foreign policy and development cooperation. The EU readmission 
policy forms an integral part of the Global Approach.106 
Under the panoply of the Global Approach, the EU has developed sev-
eral parallel models which all form an integral part of the Approach: mobil-
ity partnerships, cooperation platforms for migration and development, and 
Migration Information and Management Centers. While the mobility partner-
ship, which arose from the EU-Africa meeting in Rabat in 2006, is the most 
formalized model of migration partnership, the cooperation platforms for 
migration and development are the least formal.107 Cooperation platforms are 
characterized by a structural dialogue between the partnership country and 
the EU in which efforts are made to both strengthen control over migration – 
including cooperation on readmission – and economic development. While 
only one platform exists to date, signed with Ethiopia in 2007, since that same 
year the European Commission has been invited by the Council to launch pilot 
mobility partnerships with a few countries. The EU entered into mobility part-
nerships with Moldova and Cape Verde in 2008, with Georgia in 2009, Armenia 
in 2011 and Morocco in 2013. It has specifically attempted to link mobility part-
nerships with cooperation on readmission, and today, EURAs exist with all of 
these countries but Morocco.
In February 2009, the EU and Ethiopia established a cooperation plat-
form for migration and development, and Norway was soon invited to join 
this UK-led initiative.108 According to one informant, this invitation was 
extended to Norway after it had reached out to the European Commission and 
clearly expressed a will to participate in appropriate aspects of the GAMM.109 
Participation in the EU’s cooperation platform in general, and its coopera-
tion platform in Ethiopia in particular, seemed appropriate to Norway for 
several reasons. The 2009 White Paper on Norwegian Refugee and Migration 
Policy in a European Perspective conveys great expectations about how Norway 
will be able to benefit from being part of such comprehensive efforts: ‘when 
[Norway’s actions] are coordinated with other European states, there is 
106 Council of the European Union (2011), Council Conclusions on Readmission, supra note 
3, at 2.
107 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 8.2.3.
108 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 8.2.3. See also A. Weinar 
(2011), EU Cooperation Challenges in External Migration Policy, Research Report EU-US 
Immigration Systems 2011/02, EUI, at 8.
109 Interview JD (18 September 2013), See also JD. White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, 
para. 9.6.
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 reason to hope for greater effects both in terms of migration control and the 
region’s development.’110 However, its participation in the EU cooperation plat-
forms does not entail any legally binding agreements. This informal nature is 
a core reason for why Norway could participate in this EU initiative, where 
the Schengen-cooperation was merely one small aspect embedded within a 
larger package containing mostly EU external relations.111 The informal nature 
of cooperation has not, however, hindered a Norwegian expectation that par-
ticipation in such a platform may further the conclusion of more Norwegian 
readmission agreements.112 Furthermore, in stark contrast to the EU’s mobil-
ity partnerships with countries such as Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, which 
are only tangentially important to Norwegian external relations and develop-
ment aid, Ethiopia, and the Horn of Africa in general, is a clear priority in the 
work of both the MFA and the JD.113 Norway receives many asylum seekers 
from the Horn of Africa and the region is also important for Norwegian exter-
nal relations and development aid. The MFA and the JD cooperate in defin-
ing Norway’s contribution to the EU cooperation platforms.114 The fact that 
readmission (and development aid) was not to be negotiated in a stand-alone 
fashion as explained earlier, but rather as one aspect of a larger strategy, must 
have appeared more preferable to the MFA.115
Approximately 10 countries participated in the EU-Ethiopian cooperation 
platform, but it soon became clear that it was difficult for these to agree upon 
the strategy and the focus of the platform.116 Apart from differences in opinion 
amongst the EU-members, Ethiopia allegedly aggravated the cooperation by a 
series of what were perceived as willful misunderstandings about the nature 
and form of readmission to Ethiopia. When the platform fizzled out in 2010, 
despite attempts from Sweden to rescue it, Norway had only participated in 
two meetings. The catastrophe that one must admit the cooperation platform 
in Ethiopia turned out to be has nevertheless not discouraged Norway from 
aiming to participate in future cooperation initiatives. Recognizing that par-
ticipating in EU cooperation partnerships brings forth a new dimension to 
Norway’s cooperation with the EU, the Norwegian government has expressed 
110 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 9.6. 
111 Interview JD (18 September 2013).
112 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 9.6. 
113 MFA (2009), Interests, Responsibilities and Opportunities. The main features of Norwegian 
foreign policy, Report No. 15 2008–2009.
114 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 9.6.
115 Interview MFA (20 September 2013).
116 Interview JD (12 September 2013).
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an expectation that initiatives similar to the EU-Ethiopia cooperation platform 
will be taken also with other countries in the region.117 Following the conclu-
sion of EU’s mobility agreement with Morocco in mid-2013, Morocco alleg-
edly floated the idea of a Norwegian-Moroccan cooperation along the lines of 
what was laid out in the EU-Moroccan mobility agreement.118 Considering that 
North Africa is an increasingly prioritized region for Norwegian politics, these 
developments will be interesting to follow. 
4.5 Conclusions
This section has examined how readmission agreements relate to Norwegian 
and EU external relations. It has shown how the integration of readmission 
agreements and development aid is a clear political goal for the Norwegian 
government, and how Norway’s external migration policies and activities are 
increasingly linked to the work of the EU. Norway’s participation in the EU’s 
GAMM is nevertheless limited by two important factors. First, the GAMM is a 
policy package firmly placed within EU external relations and is thus only tan-
gentially within the Schengen cooperation. This means that Norway is limited 
to participation of a less formal nature, i.e. cooperation platforms rather than 
mobility partnerships. Second, Norway’s participation may also be limited by 
internal political perceptions about linking readmission and development 
aid. The prevailing view amongst influential actors in the realm of Norwegian 
development aid is that the linking of readmission agreements to develop-
ment aid undermines basic principles of poverty reduction. This view appears 
to function as an effective stumbling block against the implementation of the 
wider political goal to link readmission agreements and development aid. 
5 Conclusions
The aim of this article has been to offer an analysis of the objective and sub-
stance of Norway’s readmission agreements in light of European Union read-
mission policies. The analysis has shown how Norwegian readmission practice 
is far from being disconnected from overall EU policies; in many respects 
Norway’s practice is a direct outcome of such policies. Readmission policy 
developments on the EU level specifically impact Norway’s practice in three 
important ways. First, as part of a preventative strategic policy, Norway seeks to 
conclude readmission agreements with countries with which EU  readmission 
117 JD (2009), White Paper on Immigration, supra note 5, para. 9.6. 
118 Interview JD (18 September 2013).
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agreements (EURA) exist. With the exception of Georgia, all of Norway’s agree-
ments that were concluded with third states after the conclusion of a EURA 
essentially follow the structure and content laid out in the corresponding 
EURA. Second, EU visa facilitation agreements that are paired with EURAs 
form an indirect link between EU and Norwegian readmission agreements. To 
ensure harmony in the Schengen system, Norway is obligated to enter into visa 
facilitation agreements with these same states. The negotiation of readmis-
sion agreements almost always follows the conclusion of such visa facilitation 
agreements. Third, Norway uses the EURA-format as a basis for negotiations 
even with countries where no EURA exists, such as in the cases of Tanzania 
and Kazakhstan. 
This article also examined Norway’s participation in the EU Global Approach 
on Migration and Mobility. It finds that although the integration of readmis-
sion agreements and development aid is a clear government policy, Norway’s 
participation in initiatives such as GAMM is limited by the GAMM being only 
tangentially within the Schengen cooperation, and also by national political 
perceptions about linking readmission and development aid. 
 Acknowledgement
The author is a researcher on the VAM-project ‘Migration to Norway. Flows and 
Regulationsʼ, financed by the Research Council of Norway.
